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With the U.S. military under intense scrutiny to cut costs, the Department of 
Defense must determine ways to use its limited resources more efficiently. One 
financial incentive ripe for change is the retention bonus. This compensation tool, 
used by the military to retain highly qualified individuals, could be harnessed 
more effectively with an auction mechanism for distribution. 
This thesis studies three different types of auctions, and examines which 
auction would be utilized best by the government as a retention tool. The three 
auctions analyzed were a sealed bid-discriminatory auction, a sealed bid-uniform 
auction and a sequential bid-uniform auction.  
The results of the experiment showed that discriminatory auctions fared 
best overall. Sealed bid-discriminatory auctions had a significant savings of 5.1% 
over sealed bid-uniform auctions and a 10.1% savings over sequential bid-
uniform auctions. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY ...................................................................... 2 
B. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY ............................................................... 2 
II. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................. 3 
A. RETENTION BONUS COMPENSATION ............................................. 4 
1. Current Retention Bonus Process ......................................... 4 
2. Problems with the Current Retention Bonus Structure........ 6 
III. AUCTION THEORY ........................................................................................ 9 
A. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO AUCTIONS ............................................. 9 
B. AUCTION TERMINOLOGY ................................................................. 9 
1. Private Value and Common Value Auctions .......................... 9 
2. Auction Implementations ...................................................... 10 
3. Other Factors ......................................................................... 11 
IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN ................................................................................ 15 
A. OVERVIEW ........................................................................................ 15 
1. Types of Auctions and Their Treatments ............................ 15 
B. SEALED DISCRIMINATORY AUCTION ........................................... 16 
1. Participant’s Role .................................................................. 17 
2. Private and Common Costs .................................................. 17 
3. Revenue and Profit Earned ................................................... 18 
4. Tiebreakers and Sample Quiz ............................................... 18 
C. SEALED UNIFORM AUCTION .......................................................... 19 
1. Revenue and Profit Earned ................................................... 19 
D. SEQUENTIAL UNIFORM AUCTION ................................................. 19 
1. Time Limit for Each Round ................................................... 20 
2. Revenue and Profit Earned ................................................... 20 
V. MATERIALS AND METHODS ...................................................................... 21 
VI. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS .......................................................................... 23 
A. PROCUREMENT COST .................................................................... 23 
1. Overall Procurement Costs ................................................... 24 
2. Ratio of Procurement Cost to Total Cost ............................. 29 
B. EFFICIENCY ...................................................................................... 31 
C. BEHAVIOR ........................................................................................ 34 
1. Discriminatory Private and Common Value ........................ 35 
2. Uniform Private and Common Value .................................... 39 
3. Sequential Private and Common Value ............................... 43 
4. Discriminatory Private Value ................................................ 47 
5. Uniform Private Value ........................................................... 48 
6. Sequential Private Only ......................................................... 49 
VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 51 
 viii 
LIST OF REFERENCES .......................................................................................... 53 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. FY 2014 ACCP for type/model/series (after PERS-43, 2014) .............. 6 
Figure 2. Number of volunteers, treatment types and rounds per treatment ..... 16 
Figure 3. Discriminatory auction payout ............................................................ 18 
Figure 4. Uniform auction payout ....................................................................... 19 
Figure 5. Cardboard cubicle computer dividers ................................................. 22 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Six treatments conducted during experiment ..................................... 15 
Table 2. Average procurement cost (private + common) .................................. 25 
Table 3. Average procurement cost (private only) ............................................ 26 
Table 4. Average procurement costs (session 1) ............................................. 28 
Table 5. Average subject ratio of procurement to total cost ............................. 30 
Table 6. Efficiency of treatments (all sessions) ................................................ 32 
Table 7. Efficiency of treatment (1st treatment of session) ................................ 33 
Table 8. Discriminatory private and common bid to total cost .......................... 35 
Table 9. Discriminatory private and common bid to estimated total cost .......... 36 
Table 10. Discriminatory private and common bid to estimated total cost 
(periods 1 to 5) ................................................................................... 37 
Table 11. Discriminatory private and common bid to estimated total cost 
(Periods 6 to 10) ................................................................................. 38 
Table 12. Uniform private and common bid to total cost .................................... 39 
Table 13. Uniform private and common bid to estimated total cost .................... 40 
Table 14. Uniform private and common bid to estimated total cost (periods 1 
to 5) .................................................................................................... 41 
Table 15. Uniform private and common bid to estimated total cost (periods 6 
to 10) .................................................................................................. 42 
Table 16. Sequential private and common bid to total cost ................................ 43 
Table 17. Sequential private and common bid to estimated total cost ................ 44 
Table 18. Sequential private and common bid to estimated total cost (periods 
1 to 5) ................................................................................................. 45 
Table 19. Sequential private and common bid to estimated total cost (periods 
6 to 10) ............................................................................................... 46 
Table 20. Discriminatory private value bid to total cost ...................................... 47 
Table 21. Uniform private value bid to total cost ................................................. 48 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACCP aviation career continuation pay 
BCA Budget Control Act 
CO  commanding officer 
DOD Department of Defense 
MILPERS Military Personnel 
NFO  naval flight officer 
O&M Operations and Maintenance 









We would like to thank our thesis advisor, Dr. Noah Myung, for his 
tutelage during the preparation and execution of the project.  
—Mike Winters and Terry W. Triplett 
 
Additionally, I would like to thank Terry Triplett for working with me over 
the last 18 months on our MBA program and being a trusted friend and 
colleague. I would also like to thank my wife, Jessica, for her love and support, 
no matter what endeavor I undertake, and my sons, Grayson and Brayden, for 









Retention bonuses are a tool that businesses use to keep in service those 
qualified individuals who are critically needed to reach their organization’s goals. 
The military, similar to a civilian company in its desire to retain fully qualified 
individuals, uses a set of retention devices to keep a portion of its most-qualified 
service members on active duty. Monetary allowances for these qualified 
individuals are used to ensure that the member will commit to another several 
years of service and reach certain milestones in their career.  
With an ever-tightening federal budget that is affecting all aspects of the 
government, especially the Department of Defense, government services must 
ensure the upmost spending efficiency. When it comes to outlays for retention 
bonuses, however, the most efficient use of resources is not being undertaken. 
Retention bonuses are evenly distributed to all members based on previously 
estimated data, but rarely do they meet the DOD’s retention goal. A more 
efficient and viable option would be for the services to allocate these bonuses 
with the input of the members—specifically, the values that these members place 
on remaining on active duty.  
The use of auctions, where service members could state their willingness 
to stay on active duty by submitting a bid, could narrow the gap between what a 
member is willing to accept to remain on active duty and the government’s 
financial limits concerning bonuses. There are several benefits of utilizing an 
auction. First, utilizing an auction to determine a retention bonus does a better 
job tailoring the bonus to a particular community in the U.S. Navy, as it is 
inefficient to use retention compensation that is not tailored to a particular 
community (Coughlan, Gates, & Myung, 2014). Second, utilizing an auction helps 
to retain the right number of people (quantity) and to reduce cost (Coughlan, 
Gates, & Myung, 2013). This can significantly reduce the over or under retention 
we currently observe across communities in the U.S. Navy. Finally, while it is 
outside the scope of this thesis, auction can be modified to redistribute non-
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monetary incentives (Coughlan et al., 2013) or to retain a higher quality of 
service members compared to a regular auction or the status quo (Myung, 2013).  
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
We conducted an experiment to test the performance and behavior of 
three potential auction formats that can be utilized for retention auctions in the 
military. The three auctions used in the experiment were a sequential bid uniform 
auction, a sealed bid uniform auction, and a sealed bid discriminatory auction. 
These auction formats and the parameters were designed by Prof. Noah Myung 
at the Naval Postgraduate School.   
The results of the experiment showed that discriminatory auction had the 
lowest procurement cost. Furthermore, it was also the most efficient auction type. 
Efficiency was measured in terms of procuring or selecting the group of people 
with the lowest cost. Sealed bid discriminatory auctions had a significant 
procurement cost savings of 5.1% over sealed bid uniform auctions, and a 10.1% 
savings over sequential uniform auctions. 
The data also shows that it is in the interest of the seller to familiarize their 
bidders with how treatments work. In most cases, efficiency was increased and 
procurement costs were reduced as players became more familiar with the 
bidding process. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II focuses on background for the research, including the current 
compensation system and why it must be changed. Chapter III describes 
different types of auction theory and defines the auction types used to conduct 
the experiment. Chapter IV contains the design and setup of the experiments 
conducted. Chapter V provides details about the materials and methods that 
were used. Chapter VI has the results and recommendation, and Chapter VII has 
the conclusion and final remarks. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
On December 19, 2014, President Barack Obama signed a $585 billion 
defense bill that focused on balancing combat readiness with tight fiscal controls. 
This defense bill is one of many over the next several years that will attempt to 
maintain U.S. military presence in areas of national interest while managing 
spending limits for all of the service components. The Department of Defense 
(DOD) monetary limits and financial control measures are part of the president’s 
plan for a massive deficit reform, with a goal of almost $2 trillion in deficit 
reductions, from cuts to the DOD as well as other sectors of the government 
(Office of Management and Budget, 2015).  
The president’s long-term deficit reduction plan has brought about new 
legislation over the last several years, such as the 2011 Budget Control Act 
(BCA), that sought to set limits on discretionary appropriations for several years. 
This law, as well as other novel regulations concerning federal spending, has the 
DOD looking for ways to meet the congressionally required cost reductions. For 
the DOD to meet such criteria, policymakers are looking at ways to cut costs 
from every area, including measures to reduce the size of the military forces, cut 
healthcare costs, overhaul retirement benefits, set a limit on pay increases, and 
eliminate acquisition programs.   
Ensuring an optimum level of personnel on active duty is one way the 
DOD will attempt to limit costs in one of its major appropriation categories called 
Military Personnel (MILPERS) (Congressional Budget Office, 2014). This 
appropriation houses the basic pay, allowances and retention bonuses that are 
offered to service members. It currently makes up 27% of military spending, 
second only to the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation, which 
currently represents 40% of all DOD expenditures (Congressional Budget Office, 
2014).    
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To ensure that the military is retaining the correct number of members 
needed for vital military positions at a minimum cost to the DOD, the services 
need to create new processes for retention; specifically, they must devise a way 
to distribute retention bonuses with the highest level of efficiency. This will retain 
the best service members to fill critical jobs, and come at the smallest financial 
commitment to the Navy. One way to conduct the distribution of these cash 
retention bonuses is through a market-based auction, which will allow service 
members to bid for the bonus they require to remain on active duty. According to 
Stoskopf, Sever and Nguyen, market-based compensation allows “the flexibility 
to recognize differing market rates of pay based on performance, skill level or 
market conditions, and a reasonable level of control over salary costs and 
internal equity” (Stoskopf, Sever, & Nguyen, 2012). 
A. RETENTION BONUS COMPENSATION 
1. Current Retention Bonus Process 
In 1973, the U.S. military transitioned to an all-volunteer force, eliminating 
the involuntary draft obligation it used to meet personnel requirements. Since this 
transition took place, the military has had to offer compensation that would rival 
similar civilian occupations and offer pay that was within the budget constraints of 
the DOD. There is constant debate over compensation amounts, and it is based 
on several factors, including the current tempo of operations, the demand for 
qualified personnel and the budgetary limits imposed on each service.    
Currently, U.S. military members are given several forms of payment for 
their service. This includes basic pay, which is based on the member’s rank and 
years of service, allowances in the form of a stipend for housing and subsistence, 
and other special compensation and bonus payments dependent on the 
member’s job and deployment activity. This research focuses on the portion of 
compensation regarding retention bonuses. These bonuses are offered when a 
member’s obligated service commitment is complete, and the military is 
attempting to entice them to remain on active duty. 
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For example, the Navy attempts to retain its aviators with a program called 
aviation career continuation pay (ACCP). It occurs at around 10 years of service 
and involves offering a sum of money to those pilots and naval flight officers 
(NFO) who are at a point in their career where they have to make a decision to 
remain on active duty or depart the service (PERS-43, 2014). According to the 
ACCP program, this is generally the first point in their career where they must 
make this continuation decision.  
The ACCP monetary amounts are based on the number of senior officers 
(referred to as department heads) that each aviation community requires for its 
future squadron manning requirements. Commonly referred to as the department 
head bonus, the allotments are based on the type, model and series of aircraft 
flown and the retention that this community is presently experiencing. In the 
tactical air (TACAIR) community for example, retention is lower than the pilots 
required so the retention bonus contract offers $125,000 for an additional five-
year term of active duty. Alternatively, the P-3/P-8 community, whose retention is 
not as dire, currently offers a bonus of $75,000 for an additional five-year 
commitment. See Figure 1 for all ACCP payouts (PERS-43, 2014). For a 
comprehensive overview of the ACCP bonus system as well as the standard 
naval aviator career progression path, reference the thesis by Brett Williams 
(Williams, 2015).  
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Figure 1.  FY 2014 ACCP for type/model/series (after PERS-43, 2014) 
The ACCP also involves offering a sum of money to commanding officers 
(CO), who hold the rank of commander and are approaching the decision to 
retire or continue service through the rank of captain. For these leaders that are 
approaching the 20-year mark, which makes them eligible for full retirement 
benefits, a $36,000 bonus is offered to commanding officers that will require 
them to remain on active duty for at least two more years or until they screen for 
their next rank (PERS-43, 2014). 
2. Problems with the Current Retention Bonus Structure 
The ACCP bonus, similar to many bonuses in the DOD, is offered to 
individuals without their input and is based on current needs in navy manning. In 
both examples described, there is a lump sum of money that is offered to all 
HM PILOT 75,000$          
HSC PILOT 75,000$          
HSL/HSM PILOT 75,000$          
VAQ PILOT 125,000$       
VAW/VRC PILOT 125,000$       
VFA PILOT 125,000$       
VP PILOT 75,000$          
VQ (P) PILOT 75,000$          
VQ (T) PILOT 75,000$          
VAQ NFO 100,000$       
VAW NFO 75,000$          
VFA NFO 75,000$          
VP NFO 75,000$          
VQ (P) NFO 50,000$          
VQ (T) NFO 100,000$       
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aviators in a community without feedback on the member’s personal preferences, 
or service member needs. 
Yet, in reality, there should be some internal or private values that a 
member would place on their service. Not remarkably, there are members who 
value their current position so much that they might not even need a bonus to 
choose to be retained in the Navy. Alternately, there are some who would require 
a dollar amount in excess of what the government was willing to pay. It is unlikely 
that this number is exactly the same for all service members. 
Additionally there exists a common value between all members who are 
participating. This could potentially be thought of as the opportunity cost of 
deciding to take the bonus. How much does one value the time spent contracted 
to the bonus versus the time they could spend doing something else.   
Therefore, a simple bonus system like exists today causes inefficiencies 
because it does not account for the service member’s private and common 
values. If a member’s private value was to be considered in conjunction with the 
military’s bonus it is possible that those individuals would be retained at a far 
lower cost. In the example above, an aviator who joined the military with the 
intent of staying in for 20 years would probably need a smaller amount of 
compensation to remain on active duty. If a TACAIR pilot with ten years in the 
Navy who always wanted to retire at the 20-year mark would stay on active duty 
without a bonus, then the Navy would be using a $125,000 retention tool that 
was unnecessary. The personal desire to serve on active duty, or other private 
values, if taken into account by the policymakers who decide the size of each 
retention bonus, could significantly decrease the amount of money that must be 
appropriated each year for retention bonuses.   
  
 8 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 9 
III. AUCTION THEORY 
A. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO AUCTIONS 
This chapter will present a brief introduction to the auction types and 
models used. Our attempt is to cover the models we used and provide enough 
background information to the reader to be able quickly to understand our 
methods and results. For more detailed explanations of auctions types and the 
detailed theory behind their usefulness in specific scenarios, please see Krishna 
(2010) and Klemperer (2004).  
Auctions have played a major role in society for thousands of years. The 
earliest recorded auction was dated to some 500 B.C. in Babylon. Auctions are 
used today for everything from commodity markets to online shopping, to the 
method in which the U.S. government sells bonds to finance its spending 
(Krishna, 2010, p. 1). 
They have been used to provide a means of selling goods at a price point 
that, in a fundamental sense, clears the market and maximizes the producer and 
consumer surplus. In practice, however, this simplistic view of auctions is 
generally never realized due to many internal and external factors that have 
made them very interesting economic testing grounds for study.   
B. AUCTION TERMINOLOGY  
1. Private Value and Common Value Auctions 
In private value auctions, a bidder holds an independent value of an object 
that is formed without any information other than that which is personally held. 
Additionally, this value would have no bearing on any other participant’s value of 
the object. Generally, a typical analogy this type of auction model is that of an art 
auction. A single bidder might value a piece of art at a certain level that is very 
different from another, and this value would differ for independent and personal 
reasons. 
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Common value auctions generally have the property of having private 
information that gives bidders a signal to the true value of an object. This true 
value is common between all participants, but it would not be precisely known. 
Klemperer uses the example of an oil lease by a drilling company. Its value  
Depends on how much oil is under the ground, and bidders may 
have access to different geological ‘signals’ about that amount. In 
this case a bidder would change her estimate of the value if she 
learnt another bidder’s signal, in contrast to the private value case 
in which her value would be unaffected by learning any other 
bidder’s preferences or information. (2004, p. 13) 
Finally, a combination of private and common values can be used to 
create a hybrid of these two auction types. In this form, the participant would 
have both private and common value information to consider when making bid 
decisions. Goeree and Offerman (2003) argue that this form of auction is more 
realistic to most real world auctions, citing examples of art having a common 
resale value or the drilling companies having private value proprietary 
competitive advantage over their competitors. This form of auction will be the 
primary focus of our research. 
2. Auction Implementations 
The ascending bid auction, also commonly called the English auction, is 
one of the more widely recognized auction forms. Ascending bid auctions are 
those in which the price of the object being bid on continually is raised by the 
buyers in the auction. At such a time that the price is at a point that only one 
bidder still desires to pay that amount or a time limit has expired, the auction is 
over. This type of auction is seen in many contemporary settings such as art and 
property auctions or popular Internet locations such as Ebay.com. 
Generally, English auctions are performed as forward auctions where 
bidders are outbidding their competitors by raising their bids. This form of auction 
can also be run as a reverse auction. In this implementation, the bidders would 
undercut their competitors bid, until the auction is over. This is most easily 
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imagined in the case of some kind of procurement auction where multiple bidders 
are attempting to secure the right to service a single procurer.  
Descending bid auctions are slightly different in that they start with a high 
initial bid, and then the price lowers until such time that an individual calls out in 
affirmation that they accept the bid or the seller’s reservation price has been met, 
and the auction is over. This form of bidding has also been called a “Dutch 
Auction” named after the selling of cut flowers at Dutch markets even today 
(McAffe, McMillan, & Ontario, 1985, p. 702). 
First price sealed bid auctions are generally just as they are described by 
their name. They are the action of submitting a ‘sealed bid’ in which there is no 
signal of information between bidders. The winner will be the bidder with the 
most favorable bid to the seller, and they will pay that price to the seller. First 
price auctions can create complicated equilibrium behavior as they present a 
situation where making bids equal to one’s own personal value of the object 
would give a net surplus of 0 to that individual. Therefore, the optimal bid is a 
tradeoff between the probability of winning the auction and a bidder attempting to 
increase their net surplus level (Krishna, 2010, p. 14). 
Second price sealed bid-auctions are similar to the first price in that the 
winner of the auction will be the one who bids most favorably to the seller, though 
the winner will only pay the amount of the second most favorable bid. This type 
of bidding creates some strategy differences in the way a bidder might approach 
this type of auction. These auctions are also called “Vickery” auctions after 
William Vickery, who wrote some of the earliest work on the strategic analysis of 
auctions.   
3. Other Factors 
Bidders face many internal and external factors during bid decision 
making. Many times, these create externalities that limit the efficiency of auction 
formats. The following paragraphs discuss some of the more common 
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externalities found in auctions and those that could have accounted for the 
inefficiencies seen in our data. 
Since we are dealing with auctions that contain common values, we must 
anticipate some amount of inefficiency due to players over-compensating or 
over-valuing their position. This is referred to as winner’s curse. It is a by-product 
from common value auctions where imprecise information is known of the exact 
value of an object. The bidder has only a signal of what the true common value is 
and must rely on this information when making bids. If the bidder is sent a low 
signal of the true common value and does not have a correction applied, then the 
bidder may win, but at a net loss in surplus. “Failure to take into account the bad 
news about others’ signals that comes with any victory can lead to the winner 
paying more, on average, than the prize is worth, and this is said to happen often 
in practice” (Klemperer, 2004, p. 14). This failure of correctly estimating the exact 
value is the winner’s curse.   
Payout rules affect decision making while participating in an auction. The 
two forms we use in our study are discriminatory and uniform price payouts. In 
discriminatory auctions, winning players will be rewarded with compensation 
equaling their bid amount. In uniform-type auctions, all winning players are paid 
the same amount. In our uniform auction experiments, players were awarded an 
amount equal to the first excluded bid in each group. 
Reserve prices also affect a bidder’s efficiency. This term refers to the 
minimum value at which the seller will agree to sell the item. This idea plays a 
role with first and second price bidding, as it can affect the surplus gained by the 
bidders. Reserve prices have a more marginal affect in first price auctions, as 
any bidder who values the item less than the reserve price would not profit by 
making a bid at all (Krishna, 2010, p. 21).  
All bidders must make risk decisions. Risk deals with the degree to which 
a person makes decisions based on the information provided. Risk aversion, 
neutrality, or prone-type individuals will approach situations in different ways, and 
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their bidding strategies will ultimately depend on this trait. Our experiment 
attempts to identify a bidder’s risk tolerance by having them participate in a small 
game to which they will risk a known amount of money in a controlled way. From 
this data, we can examine their actual bids in the auction experiments and 
deduce if their bids were optimal based on this calculated preference. 
Finally, we must account for or attempt to prevent any form of collusion 
from the participants. Collusion deals with the incentives provided by participants 
sharing information with each other outside the realm of the experiment. This 
behavior can lead to unfair advantages to those that collude. Krishna (2010) 
labels the formation of these groups as “bidding rings.” He delves into the subject 
by exploring models of collusion as a “mix of cooperative and non-cooperative 
game theory” where the standard efficiency rules of basic auctions change (p. 
157). This level of detail is outside the scope of this experiment, and we handle it 
by randomizing groups of players and monitoring the experiment in a lab setting. 
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IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
In this chapter, we will analyze the auctions that were chosen for the 
research, how these auctions created six treatments that were used for the 
experiment, and the details of their design.  
A. OVERVIEW 
1. Types of Auctions and Their Treatments 
As stated in the model, we compared three different auctions. These three 
auction types were a sealed bid-discriminatory auction, a sealed bid-uniform 
auction, and a sequential bid-uniform auction. Each auction had two treatments 
where it was conducted with both a private and common value, and then 
conducted using a private value only. Overall, our experiment was a 2x3 design 
with three auctions, each auction conducted in two different ways creating six 
treatments (Table 1).  
 
Treatment Type Abbreviation 
Sealed Bid Discriminatory (Private and Common Value) D_P+C 
Sealed Bid Uniform (Private and Common Value) U_P+C 
Sequential Uniform (Private and Common Value) S_P+C 
Sealed Bid Discriminatory (Private Value Only) D_P 
Sealed Bid Uniform (Private Value Only) U_P 
Sequential Uniform (Private Value Only) S_P 
Table 1.   Six treatments conducted during experiment 
 
Throughout the experiment, up to three of the auctions were performed 
per session, with a varying amount of rounds per auction group. The treatments 
picked for each session ensured that each treatment was conducted first at least 
once during the course of this experiment. The number of volunteers who 
participated in each session had to exceed eight in total, and had to be a multiple 
of four. This was because each round grouped four participants at random to bid 
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against each other for each round. Figure 1 shows the number of volunteers who 
performed at each session with the type of treatments they participated in, and 
how many rounds were conducted. At the end of each round, the participants at 
the session would once again be randomly matched with another set of 
participants, creating a new foursome that would bid against each other in the 
next round. There was no way for the participants to know whom they were 
bidding against at any time (Figure 2).    
 
Figure 2.  Number of volunteers, treatment types and rounds per treatment 
B. SEALED DISCRIMINATORY AUCTION 
A sealed bid discriminatory treatment meant that the participants could 
only submit their bid once with no possibility of an update. The participants had 
Session Number of Volunteers Auctions Performed Number of rounds per Auction
Sealed Bid - Discriminatory 10
Sequential Bid - Uniform 5
Sequential Bid - Uniform 10
Sealed Bid - Uniform 3
Sealed Bid - Uniform 10
Sealed Bid - Discriminatory 5
Sealed Bid - Uniform 10
Sequential Bid - Uniform 10
Sequential Bid - Uniform 10
Sealed Bid - Discriminatory 5
Sequential Bid - Uniform (Private only) 10
Sequential Bid - Uniform 10
Sealed Bid - Discriminatory 10
Sealed Bid - Uniform (Private only) 10
Sealed Bid - Uniform 10
Sequential Bid - Uniform 10
Sealed Bid - Discriminatory (Private only) 10
Sealed Bid - Discriminatory 10
Sealed Bid - Uniform 10
Sealed Bid - Discriminatory 10
Sealed Bid - Uniform 10
Sealed Bid - Discriminatory (Private only) 10
Sequential Bid - Uniform 10
Sealed Bid - Uniform 10












no idea how much the other members in their group were bidding. When the 
round was over, the results of that round revealed the winning bid. This was the 
only time other bids were revealed to the sealed bid auction participants. 
1. Participant’s Role 
The participant played the role of a private contractor that was seeking to 
sell its services to a fictitious corporation. Each round of every treatment 
represented a different service the participant was trying to sell to the 
corporation. The volunteers for each session were divided into groups of four, 
with the two lowest bidders winning the round for that treatment. We informed the 
participants that they had the ability to win every round and their company was 
only limited by the amount of costs that were to be incurred, and not on the 
number of workers they employed.  
2. Private and Common Costs  
The bidder’s cost for providing a service consisted of a private cost and a 
common cost. Before bidding, the bidders were told their private cost and an 
estimate of the common cost. This private cost (internal cost) was randomly 
chosen and uniformly and independently distributed among all participants. The 
range for the possible internal costs was between 75 and 125 francs. This range 
was based off a similar auction performed by Goeree and Offermanm (2002).  
The bidders were only given an estimation of their common cost (external 
cost). The actual common cost that the two winning bidders would have to pay 
for the job was an average of all four bidders’ estimated common costs. For each 
bidder, the estimated common costs were drawn randomly and independently 
from uniform distribution between 75 and 125. Consequently, the total cost in 
each treatment fell between a range of 150 (assuming a private cost of 75 and an 
average external cost of 75) through 250 francs (assuming a private cost of 125 
and an average external cost of 125). We also ran treatments using only private 
costs as a benchmark for the analysis of using private and common values.  
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3. Revenue and Profit Earned 
For the two lowest bidders, the revenue received was equal to his or her 
bid. Profit was determined by taking the revenue that was received for winning 
the round and subtracting the private (internal) cost and subtracting the common 
(external) cost, if it was applicable to that particular treatment. No revenue was 
earned for the two losing bidders and they also did not incur any cost. Figure 3 
shows an example of how profit was calculated for the discriminatory auction. 
Depending on the amount of revenue that the bidder received, it was possible for 
the profit to be negative for each round. Negative profits decreased the amount 
of money the participants earned during the session.    
 
Figure 3.  Discriminatory auction payout 
4. Tiebreakers and Sample Quiz 
In the event of a tiebreaker, where two bidders had bid the exact same 
price for the contract, the tie was broken by a computer random number 






1 250 100 120
2 215 105 100
3 260 90 125
4 280 80 115
=winning bid
Revenue Int. costs Avg. Ext costs Profit
Bidder 1 250 100 115 35
Bidder 2 215 105 115 -5
Profit
Profit = revenue - internal job cost - average estimate of 
external job cost
Discriminatory Auction





C. SEALED UNIFORM AUCTION 
The sealed bid uniform auction was conducted in the same manner as the 
sealed bid discriminatory auction. The only difference in this auction was that the 
participants were paid with the uniform auction guidelines. 
1. Revenue and Profit Earned  
For the sealed bid-uniform auction, the two winners of the round would be 
paid revenues equal to the first excluded bid (or third lowest bid) for that 
particular round. Profit for the sealed bid uniform treatments was equal to the 
revenue they received, minus their private cost and the average common cost 
(see Figure 4 for a uniform auction payout example).  
 
Figure 4.  Uniform auction payout 
D. SEQUENTIAL UNIFORM AUCTION 
The sequential bid auction was similar to the sealed bid auctions with the 
following differences. The sequential auction allowed participants to bid against 
each other with the ability to change their bid throughout the round. The 






1 230 125 100
2 225 105 120
3 235 90 125
4 280 80 115
=winning bid
Revenue Int. costs Avg. Ext costs Profit
Bidder 1 235 125 115 -5
Bidder 2 235 105 115 15









the time limit of each round. Also, the sequential auction allowed the competing 
participants to see each bidder’s current bid as they were updated throughout the 
round. When time expired, the two participants with the first and second lowest 
bid won that round.  
1. Time Limit for Each Round 
Unlike the sealed bid auctions, the sequential bid auction had time 
constraints for each round. For the sequential bid uniform auction, the 
participants had 90 seconds to make their bid in the first round, 60 seconds to 
make their bid in rounds two through four, 45 seconds to make their bid in rounds 
five through seven, and 30 seconds to make their bid in round eight through ten. 
The time started after everyone submitted his or her initial bid. The time was 
purposefully decreased in later rounds of the sequential auction to account for 
the learning curve of the participant’s bidding behavior.  
2. Revenue and Profit Earned  
For the sequential bid-uniform auction, the two winners of the round were 
paid in the same manner as the sealed bid-uniform auction.  
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V. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
(1) Auction Computer Program 
Experiments were conducted using zTree auction program (Fischbacher, 
2007). 
(2) Location and Test Subjects 
The experiment was performed at two locations. The first five sessions 
were conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School and the second five sessions 
were conducted at the University of Virginia. The participants were recruited 
using local recruiting materials (emails and flyers). A total of 140 people 
participated in the experiment.1 At the end of the experiment, all test subjects 
were paid cash based on the results of the decisions the participants made 
during the entire session. 
(3) Computer Setup 
The computers that were used for the experiment were standard university 
desktops located in one computer lab. There were a total of eight to 16 
computers used for the experiment, depending on the number of volunteers. This 
allowed the auctions to have two or four groups of four participants randomly 
selected each round. To prevent participants from seeing the possible bidding of 
the other participants around them, cardboard computer dividers were used 
ensure anonymity between all the participants (see Figure 5). The participants 
were also provided calculators, pens and scratch paper in the event it was 
required.  
                                            
1 We were only able to conduct experiments in multiples of four people.  
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Figure 5.  Cardboard cubicle computer dividers 
(4) Conversion Rate 
All costs and earnings associated with the experiment were measured in 
“francs,” which was a fictitious currency that had an exchange rate of $.10 per 1 
franc. At the end of the session, all participants were paid in U.S. currency equal 




VI. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Treatment data was extracted from the experiments and analyzed utilizing 
Microsoft Excel. The analysis attempts to break data down and examine how the 
treatments could be interpreted in three main focus areas. The first area was a 
procurement cost component that sought to show how much the different 
treatment types would deliver revenue to the bidders and ultimately cost to the 
auctioneer, which we refer to as procurement costs. The second focus was on 
bidder efficiency and attempts to show how well the lowest cost bidders were 
selected relative to the group they were matched against. The third displays 
behavior of bidders mapping their estimated costs and actual costs with respect 
to the bids they chose. 
All three areas include cost data aggregated from all sessions and 
treatments. The aggregated data attempts to highlight major attributes of the 
treatment types and provides a top-down view of our results. Also, we examine 
data collected from treatments conducted as the first treatment for a particular 
session. This data was selected in order to limit any learning the bidder might 
have attained from previous treatments. Each of our first treatments conducted 
ten periods each and is broken into period segments. The first five periods were 
compared to the second five periods to show any efficiency gain as subjects 
began to become more proficient in the bidding process.   
Private value only versions of each treatment are provided as a 
contrasting analysis for comparison. 
A. PROCUREMENT COST 
This section looks at the amount paid to subjects with respect to the 
particular treatment types used. The term ‘procurement cost’ is used to represent 
the amount of currency a buyer would have to pay to the winners in the auction. 
We first examine the average procurement cost for each treatment type and then 
look at the ratio of procurement costs to the total cost incurred by the winners. 
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As discussed in Chapter III, the amount the winners are paid differs 
between discriminatory and uniform treatment types. In discriminatory 
treatments, bidders are awarded the amount they bid if selected to win. In 
uniform treatments, the winning bidders are paid uniformly and, in the case of 
this experiment, were paid the first excluded bid in the group of bidders per 
period. Either way, in this section, we focus on the procurement cost—the total 
amount spent by the buyer to procure these services from the winners of the 
auction.  
1. Overall Procurement Costs 
Overall procurement costs were calculated by taking the average of 
‘revenue earned’ from all winning bidders over all treatments in that respective 
treatment type. 
When private and common values were used, sealed bid discriminatory 
showed to have a significant procurement cost savings of 5.1% over sealed bid 




Table 2.   Average procurement cost (private + common) 
 
With respect to private value only auctions, discriminatory still retains the 
lowest average cost treatment type by a considerable margin, yet uniform 
performs slightly worse with respect to the common value version. Discriminatory 
was 9.5% better than uniform and 8.5% better than sequential for the private 
treatments. This could be due to more efficient bidding by the subjects because 









D_P+C 194.06 23.58 420 1.1504216
U_P+C 204.49 14.82 418 0.724791




Table 3.   Average procurement cost (private only) 
 
Looking at only the treatments that were conducted first in the session 
shows that, over time, subjects were able to learn how to bid more effectively, 
and in most cases procurement costs went down. This would suggest that if 
these treatments were to be used on a larger scale, ensuring that adequate 
training was available to those participating would be in the interest of the seller. 































D_P 100.94 9.55 140 0.8070992
U_P 110.55 10.21 80 1.1409939






















Average Procurement Costs (Session 1) 
Private + Common  
Periods 1 to 5

















Average Procurement Costs (Session 1) 
Private Only  
Periods 1 to 5
Periods 6 to 10
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Table 4.   Average procurement costs (session 1) 
 
Overall, from a procurement perspective, discriminatory-type treatments 
appear to have the lowest cost per average and, once subjects had some 
experience placing their bids, the total procurement costs would decrease. The 
amount of learning taking place is seen in most treatments and evidenced by the 









D_P+C 201.80 15.95 80 1.78339741
U_P+C 207.22 16.20 70 1.93616513
S_P+C 206.00 22.73 90 2.39550661
D_P 102.43 13.28 30 2.42528981
U_P 112.80 9.75 40 1.54222616
S_P 112.75 10.86 40 1.71634301
D_P+C 196.90 18.69 80 2.08952323
U_P+C 200.86 13.98 70 1.67087903
S_P+C 208.27 13.49 90 1.42167983
D_P 102.67 6.13 30 1.11966059
U_P 108.30 10.27 40 1.62362368
S_P 106.25 12.24 40 1.93541555





2. Ratio of Procurement Cost to Total Cost 
Up to this point, we have only looked at total procurement costs and 
averages of the finds. Here, we look at a ratio of those costs against the total 
cost the subject would incur when their bid was selected to win. This puts the 
data in the same unit for comparison, even between private only and private + 
common cost treatments. This ratio is calculated by dividing the procurement 
cost for each winning bidder and dividing by the total cost associated with each 
win. In the case of treatments using the private and common costs, this is the 
sum of that private cost and the actual common cost of the particular 
procurement. This ratio for the individual winner is then averaged across all such 
ratios of that same treatment type. 
 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 =  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡    
This would imply that a higher ratio would mean more cost to procure a 
bidder per dollar of cost to that bidder. Again, sealed bid discriminatory holds an 
edge on the other treatment types. For example, when looking at D_P+C 
treatment, winners’ revenues were about 1% higher than their total cost, but the 
winners from the S_S+C were receiving revenues of about 12% higher than their 


































Average Subject Ratio of Procurement to Total 
Cost by Treatment 
Treatment D_P+C U_P+C S_P+C D_P U_P S_P
Average 1.01 1.06 1.12 1.12 1.24 1.21
Stddev.s 0.13 0.10 0.34 0.11 0.16 0.19
Count 420 418 440 140 80 80
Std Err 0.0065 0.0048 0.0164 0.0093 0.0179 0.0213
 31 
B. EFFICIENCY 
Efficiency of treatment types is analyzed to get a sense of how “well” the 
treatments were able to select the lowest-cost bidders to win each auction. 
Efficiency is measured here by looking at the bidders at the group level and 
creating a ratio of the sum of the two winners’ internal private costs minus the 
two highest private costs, compared to a baseline of the sum of the two actual 
lowest private cost bidders minus the two highest bidder private costs. An overall 
efficiency for each treatment was calculated by taking an average of all such 
efficiencies. High efficiency scores are received when the auction is won by the 
individuals having the lowest private cost. 
𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =  𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃−𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃−  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 
where: 
𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤  =  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  =  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤  =  𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 
Overall, discriminatory treatments fared best when using private and 
common values. Uniform seemed to do better when only using private values. In 
addition, the efficiency levels were higher when the auctions were conducted with 





























Efficiency of Treatment (All Sessions) 
Treatment D_P+C U_P+C S_P+C D_P U_P S_P
Mean 80.99 78.10 76.00 91.88 93.86 80.16
StdDev.s 25.98 27.87 28.61 17.77 14.38 26.01
Count 190 189 220 70 40 40
StdErr 1.8847 2.0270 1.9292 2.1242 2.2744 4.1127
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Table 7 data suggests that players were more efficient as the treatment 
progressed. When looking at data from the first treatment of the session, the 
average efficiency increases in all treatment types. This might be due to subjects 
learning how to bid more effectively as the treatment progresses.   
 
 
























Efficiency of Treatment (1st Treatment in 
Session) 
Periods 1 to 5
Periods 6 to 10
D_P+C U_P+C S_P+C D_P U_P S_P
1 to 5 6 to 10 1 to 5 6 to 10 1 to 5 6 to 10 1 to 5 6 to 10 1 to 5 6 to 10 1 to 5 6 to 10
Mean 82.34 82.41 74.61 78.77 67.12 76.41 91.37 94.32 91.86 95.87 79.15 81.16
StdDev.s 23.16 26.98 29.56 26.66 32.84 28.84 20.33 10.26 17.32 10.78 28.30 24.20
Count 40 40 35 35 45 45 15 15 20 20 20 20
StdErr 3.6626 4.2667 4.9958 4.5059 4.8949 4.2987 5.2493 2.6500 3.8728 2.4115 6.3280 5.4119
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C. BEHAVIOR 
This section deals with the behavior of bidders when presented with 
information. Behavior is analyzed by graphing bids against their associated cost. 
We examine this in three ways. The first is by graphing the bid versus the total 
cost associated with each treatment period. In the case of the treatments with 
common values, we also look at what the bid was in relation to the estimated 
total cost the subject is provided as the period is being conducted. Finally, we 
show data that is drawn from treatments that were the first treatment of the 
session, as was done in other sections. This is provided again to show a baseline 
of the subjects’ relative progression in being more efficient as the treatment is 
conducted with minimal prior experience in other treatment types. 
Data for the private value auctions is also provided at the end of this 
section. As there are no common values for these treatment types, there is no 
estimate of costs and therefore no graphs for these. 
Notes for all graphs in this section:   
• Black line denotes regression of data set. Equation is regression 
equation. 
• Red line denotes 45 degree line through 0 intercept (Y=X). 
• All bid data over 500 francs is not shown to increase readability. 
For all treatments, this cut-off represents greater than three 





1. Discriminatory Private and Common Value 
Discriminatory private and common value treatments showed bidders 
generally bid roughly 4.67% over their actual costs and 4.4% over their estimated 
costs (Tables 8 and 9). This may suggest that bidders are bidding too low in the 
discriminatory auction format. Additionally, Tables 10 and 11 show that, after 
some learning, bidders would bid more closely to their actual costs. 
 
 
Table 8.   Discriminatory private and common bid to total cost 



























Table 9.   Discriminatory private and common bid to estimated total 
cost 





























Table 10.   Discriminatory private and common bid to estimated total 
cost (periods 1 to 5) 


















Discriminatory P+C Bids to Estimated Costs 
(Periods 1-5) 
D_P+C








Table 11.   Discriminatory private and common bid to estimated total 
cost (Periods 6 to 10) 
  


















Discriminatory P+C Bids to Estimated Costs 
(Periods 6-10) 
D_P+C






2. Uniform Private and Common Value 
Uniform auctions allow a bit more strategy when placing bids, as one will 
receive payout of the first excluded bid. Compared to the discriminatory auctions, 
there is a noticeable trend to bid below cost. On average, players bid roughly 
98% of their estimated costs in hopes that the first excluded bid would be higher 
(Tables 12 and 13). 
Players also seemed to be consistent in their bidding strategy through the 




Table 12.   Uniform private and common bid to total cost 



























Table 13.   Uniform private and common bid to estimated total cost 
 



























Table 14.   Uniform private and common bid to estimated total cost 
(periods 1 to 5) 
 


















Uniform P+C Bids to Estimated Costs    
(Periods 1-5) 
U_P+C








Table 15.   Uniform private and common bid to estimated total cost 
(periods 6 to 10) 
 


















Uniform P+C Bids to Estimated Costs  
(Periods 6-10) 
U_P+C






3. Sequential Private and Common Value 
Sequential treatment bidding had the most variability in bidding strategies. 
Players could see the bids of their competitors in real time, and this generally 
caused most players to become less efficient. On average, the subjects bid 
roughly 6.8% over their total cost and 6.4% over their estimated cost. The 
sequential format had the highest markup percent of the three private plus 
common treatments (Tables 16 to 19). 
 
 
Table 16.   Sequential private and common bid to total cost 



























Table 17.   Sequential private and common bid to estimated total cost 



























Table 18.   Sequential private and common bid to estimated total cost 
(periods 1 to 5) 
 


















Sequential P+C Bids to Estimated Costs  
(Periods1-5) 
S_P+C








Table 19.   Sequential private and common bid to estimated total cost 
(periods 6 to 10) 
  


















Sequential P+C Bids to Estimated Costs  
(Periods 6-10) 
S_P+C






4. Discriminatory Private Value 
Discriminatory private value auctions could be classified as the most 
simplistic treatment that was conducted. A player simply had a private value to 
deal with and their bids should be high enough to cover their costs and provide a 
marginal profit. The experiment showed that players generally required about a 
10.8% markup over their cost (Table 20). 
 
 
Table 20.   Discriminatory private value bid to total cost 

























5. Uniform Private Value 
Uniform private value auctions were also one of the simpler forms of the 
treatment types. It is Nash equilibrium to bid truthfully in this auction format, but 
we see about a 5.2% markup in their bids (Table 21). 
 
 
Table 21.   Uniform private value bid to total cost 
 

























6. Sequential Private Only 
Sequential again has a high variability with respect to bidding behavior. 
There are also many more unexplainable bids in this treatment format. On 
average however, players valued their bids at roughly 11.6% over their private 
value costs (Table 22). 
 
 
Table 22.   Sequential private value bid to total cost 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Fiscal limitations may force changes to the way retention bonuses are 
allocated in the Navy. Using an auction format for the decision of what someone 
would ultimately be paid for retention is one alternative to the current system. Our 
research was focused on comparing three auction formats and determining how 
efficient they were as well as what their cost would be to the government. 
We designed an experiment where we simulated the auction formats on a 
computer program and had individuals participate, taking on the role of a fictitious 
company selling services to an entity. The auctions were a reverse procurement 
style where bidders attempted to win by undercutting their competitors and yet 
still make a profit based on their private and common costs. We ran multiple 
rounds to provide a touch of a learning aspect and then were able to see those 
trends in the data. 
We found that overall sealed bid discriminatory was the most effective 
auction from the perspective of the government. It had a significant procurement 
cost savings of 5.1% over sealed bid uniform, and a 10.1% edge over sequential 
uniform when common values were incorporated. Also, discriminatory was 9.5% 
better than uniform and 8.5% better than sequential for the private value only 
treatments.   
In terms of efficiency (i.e., allocation of procurement to bidders with the 
lowest cost), discriminatory was also better than the two other treatment styles. 
When using common values, it clearly outperformed the other two. Using private 
only, uniform was slightly better, but the error between the two is very close. 
Sequential did relatively poorly in both cases. 
We saw bidding behavior be very different for each treatment type as well. 
Subjects were generally more conservative when bidding on discriminatory 
projects, vice the uniform and sequential where they would be paid the first 
excluded bid.   
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An issue that was apparent in the data was that there must have been 
subjects who either did not fully understand what was being asked of them or 
intentionally gave bad data. This was evidenced by a few individuals bidding 
grossly below cost or bidding the max amount of fictitious currency for a single 
period toward the end of the auction. This data seems to be limited and should 
not have a major effect on the true data. 
In conclusion, regardless of the auction format, practice is clearly needed. 
This benefits both the seller and the buyer, or the service members and the U.S. 
Navy. Our experimental data suggest that running a discriminatory auction may 
be the best out of the three formats. Finally, sequential auction format may cause 
“gaming,” by purposely losing with a high bid so that the winners can earn extra 
pay. We cannot make claim one way or another, however, whether we may see 
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